Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Governmental structures: Governmental structures are the systems and processes by which governments are organized and operate. They include the distribution of power between different branches of government, the roles and responsibilities of different government officials, and the ways in which citizens participate in government. See also State, Society, Community._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Public Choice Theory on Governmental Structures - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 183 Governmental Structures/transaction costs/Arrow’s theorem/Public choice theory/Farber: It is plausible to expect that, all else being equal, the >transaction costs of organizing a group increases with the size of the group. If this is so, what are the implications for political outcomes? >Arrow's Theorem makes it clear that voting is generally not a powerful enough institution taken by itself to create coherent, stable outcomes (McKelvey, 1976(1); Schofield, 1978(2)). How, then, do democratic governments manage to produce viable public policy? >Collective action/Public choice theory, >Public law/Public choice theory, >Arrow’s theorem/D’Agostino, >Rational choice/Public choice theory. 1. McKelvey, R. (1976). "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control." Journal of Economic Theory 12(3): 472-482. 2. Schofield, N. (1978). "Instability of simple dynamic games." Review of Economic studies 45: 575-594. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Public Choice Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Public Choice Theory
> Counter arguments in relation to Governmental Structures
